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When it comes to the protection of the freedom of the press,
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
protects the freedom of expression, fulfills a function similar to the
First Amendment in controlling states' regulation of damage to
reputation. An analysis of the abundant case law of the European
Court of Human Rights highlights the development of common
professional standards for journalists, concerning publications with
the potential to affect individuals' reputations. It appears that the
Court has developed distinct standards depending on the nature of
the medium at issue, comprising two categories: information and
opinions. It is clear that the Court wishes to promote and protect a
press it considers serious and useful for the public debate.
INTRODUCTION
Since its landmark ruling in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,' the United States Supreme Court has implemented a
. Ph.D. (Universit6 Paris I Panth6on-Sorbonne), LL.M. (Columbia Law
School, Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar). Research and Teaching Fellow in Public
International Law (Universit6 Paris I Panth6on-Sorbonne, since 2004). The
author may be contacted at regis.bismuth@gmail.com. All the decisions and
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights mentioned in this article
are accessible free of charge on HUDOC, the Court's case law database,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECH R/EN/Header/Case-Law/Hudoc/
Hudoc+database.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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progressive "constitutionalization of defamation",2 under the
auspices of the First Amendment. 3 Beyond its global impact on
free speech, this movement has been crucial in the development of
jurisprudence that circumscribes the power of states to protect
individuals' rights to reputation,4 as well as the freedom of the
press, through the establishment of implicit behavior standards for
the journalistic profession as a whole.5
A similar phenomenon can be observed in Europe through
the guarantees embedded in the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR or "the Convention"). From Portugal to Russia and
from Iceland to Turkey, almost fifty member states are required to
implement this international treaty's substantive provisions and
have given their residents the possibility, after the exhaustion of
local remedies, to challenge the decisions of domestic courts before
the European Court of Human Rights ("the European Court" or
"the Court"). 6  Given the deep control and influence of the
2. Stanley Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency,
65 VA. L. REV. 785, 801 (1979).
3. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL:
DEFAMATION, REPUTATION AND FREE SPEECH 39-76 (2006).
4. See Robert C. Post, Social Foundations of Defamation Law:
Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 721-22 (1986)
(discussing how states lost much of their ability to protect the right to
reputation after the Supreme Court, in New York Times, held that defendants'
First Amendment rights could not be ignored in defamation suits).
5. Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in Media Defamation
Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247, 330 (1985); Brian C. Murchison et al.,
Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73
N.C. L. REV. 7, 12 (1994).
6. The ECHR was adopted under the auspices of the "Council of
Europe," which aims "to achieve a greater unity between its members for the
purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their
common heritage and to facilitate their economic and social progress."
Statute of the Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No. I art. la (London, May 5,
1949). This intergovernmental organization is larger than and distinct from
the European Union, which has implemented its own human rights
instruments. See STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 47-55 (2006); see
generally Olivier De Schutter, The Two Europes of Human Rights: The
Emerging Division of Tasks Between the Council of Europe and the European
Union in Promoting Human Rights in Europe, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 509
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European Court jurisprudence over domestic legal orders in
member nations, this treaty acts in much the same way as the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which
incorporates the Constitution's Bill of Rights to apply to the states.7
Both have been instrumental in the protection of fundamental
rights of individuals, most notably the right to freedom of
expression. 9
Unlike the First Amendment, the Convention does not
expressly protect the freedom of the press. Article 10(1), protecting
"freedom of expression," which includes the "freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas," has
been the main vehicle for the incorporation of freedom of the press
under the Convention. "' In the same way as the Supreme Court,
but to a more significant extent, the European Court has reviewed
claims of reputation damage recognized by domestic courts under
national law with Article 10. This has led the European Court to
revamp old censure legislation and, more broadly, to modify
domestic legislation with small impressionistic strokes. 1
(2008) (addressing the tension between the Council's and the EU's protections
of fundamental rights as well as their duplication of tasks).
7. Colin Warbrick, "Federal" Aspects of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 698, 700 (1989).
8. Id. at 704-08.
9. Colin Warbrick, "Federalism" and Free Speech: Accommodating
Community Standards-the American Constitution and the European
Convention on Human Rights, in IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN, ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN LAW 173,
173-195 (Ian Loveland ed., 1998).
10. Convention for the Prot. of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Europ. T.S. No. 5, art. 10(1) (Rome, Nov. 4, 1950) [hereinafter
Convention Article 10]. For an overview of the scope of rights covered by
Article 10, see Henry G. Schermers & Rick A. Lawson, The Fundamental
Rights of Communication, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA (EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS) 77, 77-93 (Albrecht Weber
ed., 2003); KAREN REID, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 342-366 (3rd ed. 2007); JEAN-FRANQOIS
RENUCCI, TRAITE DE DROIT EUROPEEN DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 159-214
(2007)(Fr.).
1t. See Lyn Franqois, La Preuve de la Diffamation en Droit Franqais et la
Convention Europdenne des Droits de l'Homme, in REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 445, 445 (2005) (Fr.); P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN
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This article highlights the standards developed by the
European Court in cases in which members of the press are accused
of some type of "damage to reputation" (the torts of defamation,
libel, slander, calumny, etc.).12  From this melting pot of legal
traditions, the European Court has drawn several lines
circumscribing the scope of freedom of the press in order to protect
reputation. This has led journalists in member nations to attain a
higher standard of ethical behavior in creating their work product,
leading one author to describe it as "journalism worthy of the
name."
13
Part I of this Article briefly presents the global functioning
of the protection of freedom of the press in the Convention and
highlights the methodology of Article 10 interpretation, which is
used to locate the legal issues specifically related to reputation. The
press is the vehicle for two distinct kinds of content: information
and opinion. Part II discusses the legal regime with respect to the
right to reputation in the information medium, while Part III
analyzes the legal regime of this right in the opinion medium.
I. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 10 IN LIGHT OF DAMAGE TO
REPUTATION
A. Structure and Methodology of Interpretation of Article 10
Contrary to the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment,
which protects the freedoms of speech and press, the Convention's
HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 557-85 (3rd ed. 1998).
12. As one author points out, "[t]he European practice surprises because
it interprets the Convention in a way which carries the provisions of the treaty
so deeply into the legal systems of the member States, favoring a European
standard over diverse national ones." Warbrick, supra note 7, at 699.
13. See generally HERDiS THORGEIRSDOTrIR, JOURNALISM WORTHY OF
THE NAME: FREEDOM WITHIN THE PRESS AND THE AFFIRMATIVE SIDE OF
ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2005)
(discussing the importance of the press's role as a public watchdog without the
fear of facing repercussions from the government).
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freedom of expression provision, including its progeny freedom of
the press, is not an absolute right and is explicitly limited in the
Convention. Article 10 of the Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers.
This article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may
be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary. 14
On the basis of this article, the European Court has
implemented a now long-standing, five-stage approach to determine
whether a domestic court's conviction of an individual or a legal
entity, be it civil or criminal, constitutes a violation of Article 10. The
test is composed of the following steps that must be analyzed
successively.
The first stage of the test concerns Article 10(1) and requires
that the case relate to a right protected under Article 10 of the
Convention. The second stage considers whether there has been an
interference with the aforementioned right. Responsibility incurred
for damage to reputation constitutes such an interference. For
14. Convention Article 10, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
287
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instance, in Constantinescu v. Romania,5 the European Court found
that a "conviction for libel constitutes an interference by the public
authorities with the . . . exercise of freedom of expression for the
purposes of Article 10 of the Convention."16
Once an interference with a right protected under Article
10(1) has been established, a condition that is almost always
undisputed in practice, the Court analyzes the case under Article
10(2). Article 10(2) has been interpreted to require that three
questions" be answered affirmatively to justify the interference
under the Convention. 18
First, has this interference been prescribed by law? With
regard to this criterion, the Court has emphasized the
"foreseeability" of the interference, which must be sufficiently
precise, while still providing national courts a high degree of latitude
in interpreting their domestic laws.' 9 Second, does this interference
15. 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 25.
16. Id. at 42.
17. These three questions provide the remaining three stages (stages
three to five) of the five-stage approach introduced above.
18. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, 34 (1986). In Lingens, the
Court underlined that "[s]uch interference contravenes the Convention if it
does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10. It therefore
falls [sic] to be determined whether the interference was 'prescribed by law',
had an aim or aims that is or are legitimate under Article 10 § 2 (art. 10(2))
and was 'necessary in a democratic society' for the aforesaid aim or aims." Id.
at 24.
19. Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 275. In Tammer, the
Court held that "[a] norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated
with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must
be able-if need be with appropriate advice-to foresee, to a degree that is
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may
entail.... Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a
greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application
are questions of practice .... [I]t is primarily the task of national authorities
to apply and interpret domestic law." Id. See also Radio France v. France,
2004-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 119, 147 (discussing the system of civil liability for
defamatory remarks provided by Article 1382 of the French Civil Code);
Alithia Publ'g Co. Ltd. and Constantinides v. Cyprus, App. No. 17550/03,
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serve one of the "legitimate aims" recognized by the Convention?
This condition is not frequently disputed before the Court since
Article 10(2) expressly mentions that "the protection of the
211reputation or rights of others" serves a legitimate aim.
Interestingly, in developing this factor, the Court has also taken into
account Article 8 of the Convention, which makes protecting the
right to privacy a legitimate aim. 2' The third question asks whether
this interference is "necessary in a democratic society." This
condition is undoubtedly the most disputed in case law involving
damage to reputation under Article 10. It has been recently
considered by the European Court in the following terms:
The test of "necessity in a democratic society"
requires the Court to determine whether the
"interference" complained of corresponded to
a "pressing social need," whether it was
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued
and whether the reasons given by the national
authorities to justify it are relevant and
sufficient. In assessing whether such a "need"
exists and what measures should be adopted to
deal with it, the national authorities are left a
certain margin of appreciation. This power of
appreciation is not, however, unlimited but
goes hand in hand with European supervision
by the Court, whose task it is to give a final
ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable
with freedom of expression as protected by
Article 10.22
20. Convention Article 10, supra note 10, at Art. 10(2).
21. For instance, in Radio France the Court stated that "[t]he Court
would observe that the right to protection of one's reputation is of course one
of the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, as one element of the
right to respect for private life." 2004-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 119, 148.
22. Tonsbergs Bland As and Haukom v. Norway, App. No. 510/04, para.
81 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 1, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentld=8t4018&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnum
ber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01 Clt 66DEA398649 (citation omitted):
see also Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, Applications Nos.
289
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Although this passage suggests that the European Court has
precisely defined a methodology of applying this last condition, its
judgments have shown otherwise; the Court has employed a case-
by-case approach rather than an overarching method to determine
whether Article 10 has been breached, given the diversity of
domestic regulations that are usually at stake. However, based on
the jumble of case law, it is possible to discern the main axes of
what could be described as a weighted balancing test," considering
that "[t]he Court is faced not with a choice between two conflicting
principles but with a principle of freedom of expression that is
subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly
interpreted. '24
B. Balancing Freedom of the Press and Right to Reputation:
Freedom of the Press in the Balance
It is important to understand how much weight the
European Court gives to the protection of the freedom of the press
in order to comprehend fully how the weighted balancing test
functions. In its landmark judgment on Article 10 in 1976,
Handyside v. United Kingdom,25 the European Court stated in a
much-quoted passage that "[f]reedom of expression constitutes one
of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic
21279/02 and 36448/02, para. 45 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentld=824752
&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649 (discussing how national authorities have some
discretion in deciding when it is necessary to restrict speech, but ultimately,
the European Court has supervisory jurisdiction to review these decisions and
overturn them if they do not correspond with the standard provided in Article
10).
23. Loukis G. Loucaides, Freedom of Expression and the Right to
Reputation, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED
ESSAYS 143, 152 (2007) (pointing out that "in defamation cases the Court has
been placing freedom of speech in the position of a right expressly guaranteed
by the Convention while the protection of reputation has been simply
considered as a ground of permissible restriction to the right in question").
24. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41
(1979).
25. 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
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conditions for its progress and for the development of every man"
and is applicable "not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive ... but also to those
that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the
population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society.'
26
The Court emphasized its position in Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom in 1979, finding that "[t]hese principles are of particular
importance as far as the press is concerned., 27 As the main vehicle
for the dissemination of information and ideas, the press has the
"vital role of 'public watchdog, ' ' 2s and thus its protection is a
crucial part of the protection of the freedom of expression.
The abundant press-related cases decided in the wake of
Sunday Times have given the Court opportunity to extend
significantly and clarify what content is protected under the
freedom of expression. According to the Court in Jersild v.
29Denmark, this right has a wide application that covers both print
and audiovisual mediaa. However, ten years later the Court found
it relevant to note that the latter has been said to have "a much
more immediate and powerful effect than the print media. ,'' The
Convention therefore protects the expression of any information
debated in a democratic society, leaving open almost unlimited3 2
possibilities for content to be published or broadcast by the media .
26. Id. at 23.
27. Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40.
28. Observer and the Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 30 (1991) ("Not only does the press have the task of imparting such
information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. Were it
otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of 'public
watchdog'.").
29. 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1994).
30. Id. at 26.
31. Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99, para. 79
(Dec. 17, 2004), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=7 09500&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table
=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01CI 166DEA398649.
32. See Jean-Manuel Larralde, L'Article 10 de la Convention Europdenne
des Droits de I'Homme et la Libert6 de la Presse, 69 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 39, 44 (2007) (Fr.).
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The Court has interpreted this public interest in access to
information very broadly, finding that it includes not only debate
on political and social issues, but also topics related to foreign
countries,33 health and scientific discoveries, history and religion,"
and information on private corporations and their executives.
6
Protecting this key function of the press, according to the
Court, has left a small "margin of appreciation" for states, and
while interference with this function is not prohibited per se, it is
subject to strict scrutiny by the Court.37 Its broad scope suggests,
however, that there is a progressive demarcation between both the
public and private spheres.
33. See Colombani v. France, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 28 (upholding the
French newspaper Le Monde's publication of an article revealing the
involvement of the Moroccan royal family's entourage in cannabis trafficking).
34. See Bergens Tidende v. Norway, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 371, 374
(invalidating damages awarded against a newspaper for publishing articles on
the dissatisfied patients of a plastic surgeon); Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39-42 (1979) (addressing an injunction
restraining the publication of an article related to the noxiousness of drugs
containing thalidomide).
35. See Giniewski v. France, 2006-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277, 291 (finding the
conviction of an author of a newspaper article that alleged a connection
between the Christian doctrine and the origins of the Holocaust to be an
"'interference' in the exercise of... freedom of expression").
36. See Fressoz and Roire v. France, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 4 (finding
that a private interest in "[plreserving fiscal confidentiality" was insufficient to
override the public interest in freedom of the press and public debate, which
in this case occurred through the Canard Enchan 's publication of
information about the salary of the chairman and executive director of the car
manufacturer Peugot based on his tax forms); Goodwin v. United Kingdom,
1996-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. 484, 485 (finding that a private corporation's interest in
"unmasking [a] disloyal employee" did not outweigh the public interest in
protection of a journalist's source).
37. See Observer and the Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 3, 30 (1991). In this case, the Court underlined that in the case of Article
10, the assessment of this margin of appreciation is not "limited to ascertaining
whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and
in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference
complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was
'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' and whether the reasons
adduced by the national authorities to justify it are 'relevant and sufficient."'
Id.
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Article 10 protects the dissemination of information and
opinions, two types of content that could affect individuals'
reputations. Although embedded in the same article, their legal
treatment differs under the Convention, and accordingly, the Court
has developed different standards for information and for opinions.
Both standards recognize the need to factor in the subject's right to
reputation. The Court pointed out in Lingens v. Austria that "a
careful distinction needs to be made between facts and value
judgments" ' to the extent that "[t]he existence of facts can be
demonstrated, whereas the truth of value judgments is not
susceptible of proof.,
39
II. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION AND
THE RIGHT TO REPUTATION
The Court has frequently pointed out that the mission of the
press is to "provide accurate and reliable information, and it is
obvious that freedom of expression cannot shield the press from
penalties for damage to reputation caused by the dissemination of
false information. However, the standards developed by the
European Court go beyond a simplistic dichotomy between false
and true statements.
A. The Newsworthiness of Facts
1. An Issue of Applicability of Article 10
The Court has suggested that the newsworthiness of the
facts at stake determines the applicability of Article 10 and that the
publication of information of a strictly private nature should not be
protected under freedom of expression unless it is proven that such
information contributes to the public debate. In Von Hannover v.
38. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, 28 (1986).
39. Id.
40. Colombani v. France, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 43; Goodwin, 1996-II
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 500; see also Fressoz, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 24 (mentioning
"reliable and precise information").
293
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Germany,4' a case related to the publication of photos showing
Princess Carolina von Hannover with a French actor in several
German tabloids, the Court considered that
a fundamental distinction needs to be made
between reporting facts . . . capable of
contributing to a debate in a democratic society
relating to politicians in the exercise of their
functions . . . and reporting details of the
private life of an individual who, moreover, as
in this case, does not exercise official• 41
functions.
It specified that this right to be informed "in certain special
circumstances, can even extend to aspects of the private life of
public figures, particularly where politicians are concerned. 43
2. The Requirement of the Contribution to the Public Debate
The contribution to the public debate criterion was discussed
in tditions Pion v. France," a case involving the publication of
private medical information of the former French president, who
concealed his early cancer diagnosis for several years. The Court
pointed out that "the book was published ... on a matter of public
interest, in particular the public's right to be informed about any
serious illnesses suffered by the head of State, 45 and determined that
"freedom of the 'press' was thus at stake."46 This judgment indicates
that the publication of private information on public officials may be
permitted to the extent that such information is closely connected to
the officials' pre-eminent function.
Thus, the Court has permitted the dissemination of
information concerning the polemical political past of a prime
41. 2004-Vt Eur. Ct. H.R. 41.
42. Id. at 70.
43. Id.
44. 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 39.
45. Id. at 68-69.
46. Id. at 69.
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minister 47 or the salaries unlawfully earned by someone who is "not
just a local politician of limited importance but a member of the
Austrian Parliament, as well as a member of the European
Parliament. '4" The Court has found, however, that the publication of
photographs showing the lifeless body of a public official lying on the
ground just after he was assassinated, despite the persistent objection
of the family, is protected under Article 8 since they concern "certain
events in the life of a family [that] must be given particularly careful
protection. '49
47. See Feldek v. Slovakia, in which the Court essentially allowed the
publication of information about the "fascist past" of the Slovak Minister of
Culture and Education, as it was not without factual basis. The Court
considered this statement to be a "value judgment," but emphasized that it
was "satisfied that the value judgment made by the applicant was based on
information which was already known to the general public." Feldek, 2001-
VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 85, 109-110. As the Court considered this statement "part
of a political debate on matters of general and public concern relating to the
history of Slovakia which might have repercussions on its future democratic
development," it can therefore be argued that the underlying information on
which the statement is based is covered and protected by the Article 10. Id. at
108.
48. Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria, App. No. 34315/96, para.
29 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 26, 2002), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentLd698050&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumb
er&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01 CII 66D EA398649. Although this case
concerned mainly the opportunity to publish large pictures of this politician
accompanying the article, the Court underlined that,
A politician is certainly entitled to have his reputation
protected, even when he is not acting in his private
capacity, but the requirements of that protection have to
be weighed against the interests of the open discussion of
political issues .... In the present case, . . . [t]he subject
matter of the published articles concerned his financial
situation and the accusation that not all of his income had
been earned lawfully. This is without doubt a matter of
public concern which does not fall wholly within his
private sphere.
Id. at paras. 35-36.
49. Hachette Filipacchi Associds v. France, App. No. 71111/01, para. 46
(Eur. Ct. H.R. June 14, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpt97/view.asp?
action=html&document Id=818894&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnum
ber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1I66DEA398649. The Court further
295
B. The Accuracy of Facts
1. Facts Reported by Journalists
In order to enjoy the protection of Article 10, the facts
published or broadcasted must not only be newsworthy, but must
also be accurate, since misrepresentation of reality can damage
reputations. Journalists must therefore take all necessary steps to
verify the truth of allegations. In Pedersen and Baadsgaard v.
Denmark,5" the Court dealt with the defamation convictions of two
journalists who strongly criticized a police investigation of a murder.
The journalists alleged that certain named and photographed police
officials suppressed important evidence during the investigation. The
Court underlined the "ordinary journalistic obligation to verify a
factual allegation"" and stated that "special grounds are required
before the media can dispense with their ordinary obligation to verify
factual statements that defame private individuals."" Pointing out
the shortcomings and bias of the journalists' presentation, the Court
supported the Danish Supreme Court's finding that the "applicants
lacked a sufficient factual basis for the allegation,"53 despite the fact
that the topic was considered "of serious public interest.,
54
The Court has affirmed this position repeatedly in cases
related, for instance, to false allegations of corruption of public
officials,55 failure to verify a patient's allegations of malpractice
added that "[t]he death of a close relative and the ensuing mourning are a
source of intense grief and must sometimes lead the authorities to take the
necessary measures to ensure that the private and family lives of the persons
concerned are respected." Id.




51. Id. at para. 78.
52. Id.
53. Id. at para. 92.
54. Id. at para. 71.
55. See Stfngu and Scutelnicu v. Romania, App. No. 53899/00, (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Jan. 31, 2006), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html
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F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1 166DEA398649 (finding a lack of good faith and
factual basis of allegations of corruption of a senior police officer and his wife,
a judge, although the article was published within the framework of the
broader debate of corruption in the Romanian society).
56. See Verdens Gang and Aastad Aase v. Norway, 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R.
441, 444 (refusing to consider the appeal of a conviction of a periodical and
journalist for defamation, as the Court was not satisfied that the newspaper
took sufficient steps to fulfill its obligation to verify the truth of the allegation
in question).
57. See, e.g., A. v. Norway, App. No. 28070/06, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9,
2009), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentld=
849169&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB
86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (finding a violation of the applicant's right to
protection of reputation following the publication in a newspaper of two
articles on an investigation of a murder alleging that he was the main suspect,
considering his former convictions for murder and assault, and mentioning
sufficient elements to identify him). The Court underlined that "[t]here can
be little doubt that the disputed publication entailed a particularly grievous
prejudice to the applicant's honour and reputation that was especially harmful
to his moral and psychological integrity and to his private life" and that it was
"therefore not satisfied that the national courts struck a fair balance between
the newspaper's freedom of expression under Article 10 and the applicant's
right to respect for his private life under Article 8." Id. at paras. 73-74.
Additionally Constantinescu v. Romania, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 25.,
concerned the conviction of a Romanian national for criminal defamation
after a journalist reported his comments, as the president of a teachers' trade
union, declaring that three teacher members of the previous trade-union
leadership refused to return money belonging to the union and that a criminal
complaint had been lodged against them for being "delapidatori" (receivers of
stolen goods). Id. at 33. The Romanian courts found defamatory intent,
reasoning that while making his remarks in the presence of journalists, the
Romanian national should have been aware that the prosecution dropped the
charges against the three teachers. Id. at 34. Although the Court mentioned
that the context in which these comments were made "was within a debate on
the independence of the unions and the functioning of the courts, and was thus
of public interest," it considered that the applicant "had a duty to react within
limits fixed, inter alia, in the interest of 'protecting the reputation or rights of
others,' including the presumption of innocence." Id. at 43. The Court pointed
out that "the term 'delapidatori,' which refers to persons found guilty of the
offence of fraudulent conversion, was of a kind to offend the three teachers
because they had not been convicted by a court. The Court considered that
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2. Journalists' Reliance on External Sources
The Court has developed a different approach when the
information is not directly gathered by journalists, but instead comes
from reliable sources. However, this increased latitude given to
journalists has encountered some resistance from a minority of the
Court. The Court usually admits that journalists may rely on
external sources of information. In Colombani v. France,55 a reporter
and newspaper director for the French newspaper Le Monde, who
were convicted by the French criminal courts for insulting a foreign
head of state after the publication of an article alleging the
involvement of the entourage of the Moroccan royal family in the
traffic of hashish, appealed to the European Court. 59 The newspaper
reporter relied on a report by the Geopolitical Drugs Observatory
(OGD) that the European Court had previously requested in the
wake of Morocco's application for membership in the European
Union. Acknowledging that the information contained in the report
"was not disputed and its account of the allegations in issue could
legitimately be regarded as credible," 6" the Court pointed out that "it
was reasonable for Le Monde to rely on the OGD's report, without
needing to check for itself the accuracy of the information [the
report] contained' ',6 and opined more broadly that "the press should
normally be entitled, when contributing to public debate on matters
of legitimate concern, to rely on the content of official reports
without having to undertake independent research.
' 6
1
"the applicant could ... have expressed his criticism-and thus contributed to
free public debate of union affairs-without using the word 'delapidatori.' Id.
In the end, only the author of the remarks was convicted, and the journalist
who reported the remarks was not affected by the criminal charges. However,
the European Court has drawn lines in this case transposable to journalists,
who should consider the presumption of innocence as a crucial legitimate
interest of the state entering within the scope of the exceptions to Article
10(2).
58. 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 25.
59. Id. at 32-34.
60. Id. at 43.
61. Id. at 44.
62. Id. at 43-44.
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The reputation of the underlying source seems to be an
important yardstick. For instance, the Court has determined that
journalists do not have an obligation to check the veracity of official
61documents such as pre-trial records or information published in a
serious magazine.6 In contrast, journalists cannot rely on
information included in the press release of a political party without• 61
verifying the accuracy of the information.
The judgment in Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v. Norway 
6
has raised even more controversy. This case arose from defamation
proceedings following the publication of articles alleging that
certain seal hunters carried out their activities using illegal hunting
methods.6 ' The articles relied on a report (the "Lindberg report")
and statements issued by Odd F. Lindberg, who was appointed by
63. See generally Selist6 v. Finland, App. No. 56767/00, para. 60 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Nov. 16, 2004), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp1 97/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=707763&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table-F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (arising from the conviction of a
journalist for defamation following the publication of two articles alleging that
a patient died in a hospital due to the surgeon's alcohol consumption the night
preceding the operation). The articles in question relied on the pre-trial
records for their factual bases. Id. The European Court held that, because
"the depicted events and quotations ... were derived from the police's pre-
trial record, which was a public document[,] . . . no general duty to verify the
veracity of statements contained in such documents can be imposed on
reporters and other members of the media, who must be free to report on
events based on information gathered from official sources." Id. at 60.
64. See Radio France v. France, 2004-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 119, 152 (noting
that the dissemination of information that relies on "a detailed article, backed
up by documentary research, and an interview, to be published in a weekly
magazine whose standing as a serious publication is not open to doubt").
65. See Standard Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (No. 2) v. Austria, App. No.
37464/02, para. 42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkp1 97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=813864&portal=hbkm&source=e
xternalbydocnumber&tabe=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1 166DEA398649
(holding that a newspaper that had relied on a summary of an expert opinion
provided in a press release of a political party "should have consulted this
opinion itself in order to comply with the obligation of journalistic diligence
instead of relying without any further research on the Socialist Party's press
release").
66. 1999-ILL Eur. Ct. H.R. 289.
67. Id.
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the Ministry of Fisheries as seal hunting inspector. The Lindberg
report was kept confidential by the Ministry, since it contained
allegations of offenses. It must be noted that prior to this
position, Lindberg was a freelance journalist who had published
many articles in the newspaper at issue, Bladet Tromso, about his
visits on seal hunting vessels.
71
The Court implemented a two-step analysis in order to
determine whether there were "any special grounds in the present
case for dispensing the newspaper from its ordinary obligation to
verify factual statements that were defamatory of private
individuals.",
71
First, the Court assessed "the nature and degree of the
defamation at hand., 72 It considered that, despite the shocking and
serious nature of the accusations,73 "the potential adverse effect of
the impugned statements on each individual seal hunter's
reputation or rights was significantly attenuated by several
factors. 74  One factor was that such statements "could be
understood by readers as having been presented with a degree of
exaggeration. 7 1 Another factor was that even though the
statements did not mention these individuals by name, they were
potentially identifiable.76
68. Id. at 299-301.
69. Id. at 299.
70. Id. at 335 (Palm, Fuhrmann, and Baka, J.J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 325.
72. Id.
73. Notably, these shocking accusations included "that seals had been
skinned alive and that furious hunters had beaten up Mr. Lindberg and
threatened to hit him with a gaff." Id. at 325.
74. Id. at 325-26.
75. Id. at 325.
76. The Court considered that "the criticism was not an attack against all
the crew members or any specific crew member" and noted that "while Bladet
Tromso publicised the names of the ten crew members whom Mr. Lindberg
had exonerated, it named none of those accused of having committed the
reprehensible acts." Id. The Court could potentially have considered that
they were easily identifiable by deduction. This issue was part of the criticisms
laid down in the dissenting opinion mentioned infra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text.
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Second, the Court determined "the extent to which the
newspaper could reasonably regard the Lindberg report as reliable
with respect to the allegations in question."" Despite the potential
bias implied by the report's author, who had previously authored
several articles in the same newspaper,"' the Court found that the
"trustworthiness of the Lindberg report" allowed it to determine
that "the report had been drawn up by Mr. Lindberg in an official
capacity as an inspector appointed by the Ministry of Fisheries." ' 9
The Court also considered the existence of "grounds in the present
case for dispensing the newspaper from its ordinary obligation to
verify factual statements that were defamatory of private
individuals."' " As a result, it held that "the press should normally
be entitled, when contributing to public debate on matters of
legitimate concern, to rely on the contents of official reports
without having to undertake independent research. ' 'XI The
European Court has therefore relied on a purely "external"
presumption of validity, determined here by the fact that the
information is stamped as "official," without requiring an
assessment of an "internal" presumption of validity. In this case,
the internal presumption would stem from the fact that the author
of the report published articles in the same journal on the same
topic before.
The standards set forth by the European Court have
established a mountain of protection that is too high for those
targeted by defamatory statements to climb. As such, several
members of the Court have resisted the adoption of these
standards. The three judges dissenting in Bladet Tromso criticized
the majority's application of its two-step analysis, emphasizing both
the weakness of the assessment of the harm caused by the
77. Id.
78. Id. at 326 ("The Court does not attach significance to any
discrepancies, pointed to by the Government, between the report and the
publications made by Mr Lindberg in Bladet Tromso one year before in quite
a different capacity, namely as a freelance journalist and an author.").
79. Id.
80. Id. at 325.
81. Id.
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defamatory statements 2 as well as the "unconvincing... treatment
of the question concerning the 'reasonableness' of the paper's
reliance on the Lindberg report.""3 The dissent found it was not an
"official report" and that the newspaper knew it was not official
when it relied on it because it postponed publication due to the
report's discussion of allegations of wrongdoing. Additionally, the
fact that Mr. Lindberg, having published several articles on the
same issue, "did not have the traditional profile of a Ministry
inspector" was further evidence that the newspaper knowingly took
"the risk of exposing itself to legal action by publishing the articles
without taking any steps whatsoever to check the veracity of the
claims being made. ' ' 4
The dissent therefore raised serious doubts regarding the
standard of external presumption of validity. The presumption
enables journalists to avoid sufficient verification of serious
allegations that potentially affect another's reputation because they
are labeled as "official," regardless of the overall objectivity of the
underlying information. According to a former European Court
judge, it reflects an "excessive sensitivity" and grants an "over-
protection in respect of interferences with freedom of expression as
compared with interferences with the right to reputation. ,8
5
II. DISSEMINATION OF OPINIONS AND
THE RIGHT TO REPUTATION
As mentioned above, the European Court held in Lingens




recalling the words of Justice Powell that "[u]nder the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea., 87 When it
comes to the dissemination of ideas, the standard of conduct for
82. Id. at 331 (Palm J., Fuhrmann, J., and Baka, J., dissenting) (arguing




85. Loucaides. supra note 23, at 156.
86. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. H.R. 11,28 (1986).
87. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
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journalists is different from the standard applicable to the
dissemination of facts, although the public interest focus of Article
10 remains highly relevant.
A. Freedom of Journalists to Disseminate External Ideas
1. The Freedom not to Distance from the
Content of a Quotation
Journalists, widely recognized as the main vehicle for the
dissemination of information, cannot, as a matter of principle, be
held responsible for any damage to reputation that results from
reporting ideas. As the Court stated in Thoma v. Luxembourg,8
"[a] general requirement for journalists systematically and formally
to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might
insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not
reconcilable with the press's role of providing information on
current events, opinions and ideas."' 9 As a result, journalists are
not required to counterbalance statements that potentially abridge
the reputations of others.
This standard applies to defamatory statements and even to
some of the most questionable ideas. Jersild v. Denmark9" gives a
strong indication of the degree of freedom enjoyed by journalists.
This case arose from the conviction of a Danish journalist who
interviewed members of an extreme-right group of young people
that aided and abetted the dissemination of racist statements. 9
Maintaining that this interview was broadcast "as part of a serious
Danish news programme and was intended for a well-informed
audience," 92 the Court held that:
News reporting based on interviews, whether
edited or not, constitutes one of the most
88. 2001-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. 69.
89. Id. at 88.
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important means whereby the press is able to
play its vital role of "public watchdog". . . [and
the] punishment of a journalist for assisting in
the dissemination of statements made by
another person in an interview would seriously
hamper the contribution of the press to
discussion of matters of public interest and
should not be envisaged unless there are
particularly strong reasons for doing so.93
When it comes to the dissemination of facts by the press, the
distinction between the legal treatment of official and non-official
sources of information is critical; however, there is no such
distinction concerning the dissemination of ideas. While the Jersild
judgment hinted that "particularly strong reasons" might
potentially justify the imposition of responsibility, this exception
seems narrow, pointing out that in this case, it was "undisputed that
the purpose of the applicant in compiling the broadcast in question
was not racist. 94  Therefore, the significant latitude journalists
enjoy when reporting value judgments might end where they
acquiesce, endorse, or support the contentious statements.
2. The Limits of the Freedom not to Distance from
the Content of a Quotation
The limits of this freedom were discussed recently in
Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France.95 This case arose
from the publication of the novel Le Proces de Jean-Marie Le Pen
("Jean-Marie Le Pen on Trial") which is based on the real-life
murder of a young North African man and the subsequent murder
trial of a Front National militant. 96  The book alleges the
93. Id.
94. Id. at 26.
95. Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, Applications Nos.




96. Id. at paras. 10-11.
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responsibility of the Front National, a far-right party, and more
specifically focuses on its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who appeared
in the book under his real name and was described as "the chief of a
gang of killers" and likened to Al Capone.9 ' According to the Paris
Court of Appeal, several passages of the book exceeded the
boundaries of freedom of expression, and thus the author and
publisher were found guilty of defamation.9"
After the conviction by the criminal court, the newspaper
Lib&ation published a petition signed by almost one hundred
contemporary writers who questioned the conviction and, as part of
its text, reproduced in extenso some of the contentious passages.99
Because of the newspaper's reproduction of these defamatory
passages, the director of the newspaper was also found guilty of
defamation by French courts, which explained that "[t]he polemical
aim of a text cannot absolve it from all regulation of expression."' "
Following their convictions in the French courts, the director of the
newspaper, the author, and publisher of the novel appealed to the
European Court, claiming a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention. ""
The Court found that the convictions and penalties imposed
on the author and the publisher by French courts were neither
unfounded nor disproportionate because the contentious
statements overstepped the permissible limits of freedom of
expression. 1)2 With regard to the responsibility of the newspaper
director, the Court recognized that the petition "was published in a
context of information and ideas imparted on a matter of public
97. Id. at paras. 14, 18.
98. Id. at paras. 16-18. An appeal to the Court of Cassation was
subsequently dismissed. Id. at para. 20.
99. Id. at para. 21.
100. Id. at para. 25 (citing the Court d'Appel de Paris' judgment). The
Court further justified its denial of the director's "[defense] of good faith" on
grounds that "[t]he authors of the text [at] issue had no other aim than that of
showing their support for Mathieu Lindon by repeating with approval, out of
defiance, all the passages that had been found defamatory by the court, and
without even really calling into question the defamatory nature of the
remarks." Id.
101. Id. at para. 31.
102. Id. at paras. 57-60.
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interest.""" However, it determined that the newspaper did not act
in good faith when it published its column "repeating those
allegations and remarks with approval, den[ying] that the extracts
were defamatory in spite of a finding to that effect. '" "" It found
"that it was not necessary to reproduce them in order to give a
complete account of the conviction of the first two applicants and
the resulting criticism."""5
This decision faced strong resistance from four dissenting
judges who wrote, inter alia, that the newspaper's director "could
not seriously be criticised for informing the public about the protest
movement that had emerged following the judgment ... nor could
he be criticised for failing to correct, by comments of his own, the
allegations regarded as defamatory." 16 The dissenting judges
rightly pointed out that doing otherwise would contradict the
fundamental principle that journalists should not have "to distance
themselves from the content of a quotation that might insult or
provoke others or damage their reputation. ' " 7  The dissenters
warned that such a stance is "not reconcilable with the press's role
of providing information on current events, opinions and ideas."' ""'
B. Dissemination by Journalists of their Own Ideas
In Lingens, the Court stated that "[w]hilst the press must
not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the 'protection of the
reputation of others,' it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart
information and ideas on political issues just as on those in other
103. Id. at para. 62.
104. Id. at para. 65.
105. Id. at para. 66.
106. Id. at para. 111(3) (Rozakis, Bratza, Tulkens, and Sikuta, J.J.,
dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id. Beyond the dissent, the good faith criterion discussed in this
judgment provides an indication of what is expected of journalists when they
disseminate ideas, an issue that has given rise to an abundant amount of case
law. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text for additional examples of
how the Court has used the good faith criterion when evaluating the conduct
and intent of journalists.
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areas of public interest.""' Therefore, although they enjoy great
latitude because ideas do not require proof, journalists do not
abandon their general duty to comply with basic standards of
professional conduct when they impart value judgments."' In this
respect, the freedom of the press is restricted in two ways: by the
nature of the person targeted and through the content of the idea
imparted.
1. Limitations on the Individuals Targeted
The freedom of the press to impart value-judgments varies
with the nature of the individual whose reputation is at stake. The
European Court has restricted journalists' latitude when it comes to
private figures, while relaxing its scrutiny for public ones, especially
politicians.
As early as 1986, the Court pointed out that "[f]reedom of
the press ... affords the public one of the best means of discovering
and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political
leaders,"'' . and therefore "[t]he limits of acceptable criticism are
accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a
private individual." '"12 According to the Court, the rationale for
such differentiation lies in both the necessity of open debate on
public issues as well as the conscious choice of the politician who
"inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his
every word and deed . . . and . . . must consequently display a
greater degree of tolerance." 113
109. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, 26 (1986).
110. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
111. Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26.
112. Id.
113. Id; see also Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2), 1997-tV Eur. Ct. H.R.
1266, 1275 (citing Lingens in its decision). In a subsequent case, the Court
more precisely stated that "in choosing their profession, [the politicians] laid
themselves open to robust criticism and scrutiny; such is the burden which
must be accepted by politicians in a democratic society." Ukrainian Media
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The issue of the identification of the category of public
figures has been discussed by the Court in Janowski v. Poland."4
This case arose from the conviction of a journalist who verbally
insulted municipal guards who were acting in an official capacity.
Although this case did not expressly concern the issue of freedom
of the press, the European Court noted that "it cannot be said that
civil servants knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of
their every word and deed to the extent to which politicians do,"
and therefore they should not "be treated on an equal footing with
[politicians] when it comes to the criticism of their actions."' 5
Although the criticism cannot be as intense as it could be for
politicians, the Court has suggested that a justified criticism of
public servants would be within the realm of freedom of the press;
however, the criticism would be subject to a certain level of
scrutiny.'16
It must be noted that the Court has not limited ratione
personae, the public figures falling under the scope of Article 10, to
national figures alone; it has also included those involved at the
regional' 7 and local'"' levels, as well as foreign heads of state." 9
114. 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 187.
115. Id. at 201. In this case, the Court upheld the conviction of a
journalist who did not act as such, and determined that "civil servants must
enjoy public confidence in conditions free of undue perturbation if they are to
be successful in performing their tasks and it may therefore prove necessary to
protect them from offensive and abusive verbal attacks when on duty." Id.
116. See id. The Janowski Court pointed out that "[in the present case
the requirements of such protection do not have to be weighed in relation to
the interests of the freedom of the press or of open discussion of matters of
public concern since the applicant's remarks were not uttered in such a
context." Id. Therefore, this has led to increased criticisms of civil servants
regarding the performance of their duties.
117. See, e.g., Standard Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (No. 2) v. Austria, App.
No. 37464/02, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?action=html&documentld=813864&portal=hbkm&source=externalb
ydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01 Cl166DEA398649
(concerning the Regional Governor of Carinthia, Austria).
118. See, e.g., Dlugolecki v. Poland, App. No. 23806/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Feb. 24, 2009), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
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2. Limitations on the Content of Ideas Imparted
"The limits of permissible criticism [being] narrower in
relation to a private citizen than in relation to politicians or
governments"'' 21 have resulted in greater freedom for journalists to
express value judgments about politicians than about private
citizens. Journalists, therefore, can use "a degree of exaggeration,,121,, 122
or even provocation,' 12 1 "strong, polemical, sarcastic language,
or "immoderate statements" 123 when writing about politicians. This
stance corresponds with the U.S. Supreme Court's New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan decision, in which the Court stated that "against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open," protected First Amendment speech "may well include
documentld=847661&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BFOCI166DEA398649 (concerning the defamation of a
mayor).
119. See, e.g., Colombani v. France, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 32-34
(concerning an insult to the King of Morocco). The Court, however, pointed
out "that the general public, including the French public, had a legitimate
interest in being informed of the European Commission's views on a problem
such as drug production and trafficking in Morocco, a country which had
applied for admission to the European Union and which, in any event,
enjoyed close relations with the member States, particularly France." Id. at
43. This assertion indicates that a minimum connection is necessary between
the foreign public official and the domestic public debate.
120. Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 280.
121. Stoll v. Switzerland, App. No. 69698/01, para. 148 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. 10, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=826926&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01ClI66DEA398649; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens
and July v. France, App. No. 21279/02 and 36448/02 at para. 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Oct. 22, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=824752&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
122. Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, App. No. 72713/01, para. 67
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 29, 2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documentld=722307&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnum
ber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01 Cll66DEA398649.
123. Dtugolecki, App. No. 23806/03 at para. 37.
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vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials." 1
24
To the extent that value judgments are supported with a
"sufficient factual basis,"' 25 journalists enjoy significant latitude
while imparting opinions about public figures. For instance, the
press was allowed to label the political activism of a former
Slovakian Minister who was aligned with a far-right party as
"fascist" insofar as such a statement "contained harsh words, but
was not without a factual basis" and was made "in good faith and in
pursuit of the legitimate aim of protecting the democratic
development of the newly established State." 2 6 Likewise, the right
to reputation should not prevent journalists from using irony and
metaphors. For example, journalists were allowed to use the phrase
"Bonnie & Clyde" to describe a fugitive couple flying from Austria
to Brazil when one of the two protagonists, also a member of the
Austrian Parliament, was suspected of offenses of aggravated fraud
and fraudulent conversion.'27
124. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
125. Ukrainian Media Group, App. No. 72713/01 at para. 42 (explaining
that "the proportionality of the interference may depend on whether there
exists a sufficient factual basis for the impugned statement").
126. Feldek v. Slovaki, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 85,109.
127. Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. (No. 3) v.
Austria, Application Nos. 66298/01 and 15653/02, paras. 44-47 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. 13, 2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=790931&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01C166DEA398649 (discussing the details of a case
where the owner and publisher of a magazine appealed a conviction for
defamation against Mrs. G., the cohabit6 of an Austrian politician who was
facing criminal charges, when the publication referred to Mrs. G. as "Bonnie,"
suggesting that she was involved in the criminal activity). The Court
considered that "[gliven the article's content and ironical style and the fact
that the term 'Bonnie' was always used together with its correlative 'Clyde' ...
the average reader would have understood 'Bonnie and Clyde' as a synonym
for a couple on the run." Id. at para. 44. However, the Court added that
"Mrs. G., by accompanying Mr. R., a member of parliament whose criminal
proceedings were a subject of great public interest, in his escape, had entered
the public arena and she, therefore, had to bear the consequences of her
decision." Id. at para. 47. Thus, the Court reversed the publishing company's
conviction on the grounds that it was "not based on sufficient reasons for the
purposes of Article 10." Id. at para. 45.
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In contrast, freedom of the press cannot shield journalists
from spreading unjustified insinuations,"2 or from using
gratuitously insulting language. This principle applies with even
greater force when journalists refer to matters of the private lives of
public figures. 29 In Tammer v. Estonia, the Court dealt with the
conviction of a journalist for the offense of insult under the
Estonian Criminal Code."1 During an interview, the journalist
described a female public figure who worked with and then married
the former Prime Minister of Estonia as "[a] person breaking up
another's marriage... [and] an unfit and careless mother deserting
her child."'' The Court determined that such remarks "amounted
to value judgments couched in offensive language, recourse to
which was not necessary in order to express a 'negative' opinion
[and] that the applicant could have formulated his criticism
without resorting to such insulting expressions." 
32
Interestingly, weighing the right to reputation against the
freedom of the press implies that the Court will take into
consideration the specific reputation of the private figure on a case-
by-case basis. For instance, in Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2), a
journalist described Mr. Haider, then leader of the far-right Austrian
political party FPO as "'Idiot' instead of 'Nazi."' 133 The journalist
was found guilty of defamation in Austria, but the European Court
held that the contentious word "idiot" did not "constitute a
gratuitous personal attack as the author provided an objectively
understandable explanation for [it] derived from Mr. Haider's
speech, which was itself provocative." 3 4 The Court further added
128. Stoll v. Switzerland, App. No. 69698/01, para. 148 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. 10, 2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=826926&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01Cl166DEA398649 (concerning insinuations of anti-
Semitism against a diplomat).
129. See, e.g., Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 281 (holding
that the speech of a journalist was not protected when it consisted of abusive
comments about the personal life of an Estonian public figure).
130. Id. at 268.
131. Id. at 269.
132. Id. at 281.
133. Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2), 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1266. 1270.
134. Id. at 1276.
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that although "calling a politician a Trottel in public may offend
him,"' 35  this word in the present case, "does not seem
disproportionate to the indignation knowingly aroused by Mr.
Haider."'' 3" Therefore, the same statement is not necessarily
considered as damaging to the right to reputation from one public
figure to another and the polemical dimension of a politician may
affect his protection. 137
135. Id.
136. Id. For two other cases related to Mr. Haider, see Wirtschafts-
Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH v. Austria, App. No. 58547/00, (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Oct. 27, 2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&
documentId=788629&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F6
9A27FD8FB86142BF01 C1166DEA398649, and Unabhangige Initiative
Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, App. No. 28525/95, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 26,
2002), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=
698049&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB
86142BF01Cl166DEA398649. In Lindon, the dissenting judges noted as well
that
the criticism . . . for not having carried out a "basic
verification" appears to us to be at odds with the facts and
the reality. It is clear in our view that a sufficient factual
basis could easily be derived from Mr[.] J.-M. Le Pen's
various convictions throughout his political career,
particularly for the following offences: "trivialisation of
crimes against humanity, making allowances for
atrocities;" "apologia for war crimes;"... anti-Semitism,
incitement to racial hatred;" ..... "incitement to hatred or
racial violence." . . . In addition, it may reasonably be
argued that Mr[.l Jean-Marie Le Pen's speeches and
opinions inciting and provoking hatred and violence, for
which he has been convicted, may have encouraged, and
indeed prompted, militants to commit acts of violence.
Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, Application Nos. 21279/02
and 36448/02, para. 11(5) (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007) (Rozakis, J., Bratza, J.,
Tulkens, J., and Sikuta, J., dissenting), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?action=html&documentld=824752&portal=hbkm&source=externalb
ydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01CI 166DEA398649.
137. As mentioned by a former judge of the European Court, the
conflicting rights "must be implemented and survive in harmony through the
necessary compromises, depending on the facts of each particular case."
LOUCAIDES, supra note 23, at 156.
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CONCLUSION
Beyond the debate it could generate on an emerging right to
human dignity against media excess, distinguishable from the right to
privacy, an analysis of the balance of the right to reputation and the
freedom of the press under Article 10 of the Convention has
established that freedom of the press implies not only rights, but also
"carries with it duties and responsibilities."' 38  Specifically, it has
provided that "the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists is
subject to the proviso that they act in good faith in order to provide
accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of
journalism."'"
The standards of conduct and ethics drawn by the
jurisprudence of the European Court set forth the fundamental rules
to be followed by the profession, but explicitly privilege a genuine
press against media that sacrifice "the basic ethics of journalism...
for the commercial gratification of an immediate scoop." 140 The
Court has often noted the need for journalists to act in good faith in
accordance with the ethics of journalism, and has strongly
admonished those who engage in "primitive, fourth-rate
journalism"'' and activities conducted for "the sole purpose . . . to
satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership [and that] cannot be
deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest to society." 142
By setting forth and enforcing these specific rules and parameters,
the European Court of Human Rights has established itself as the
guardian of the democratic values of the Convention, the same
138. Cumpdnd and Mazdre v. Romania, App. No. 33348/96, para. 102




140. Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v. Norway, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 289,
337 (Palm, Fuhrmann, and Baka, J.J., dissenting).
141. Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2), 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1266, 1279
(Matscher, J.. dissenting).
142. Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 70.
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values that the press is deemed to preserve by contributing "to an
exchange of ideas worthy of the name. 143
143. Oberschlick, 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1279 (Matscher, J.,
dissenting).
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